Second part of my Hydroph0bia (CVE-2025-4275) research: https://coderush.me/hydroph0bia-part2/
This one is about hijacking code execution during FW update, and overcoming a rather naive countermeasure that SecureFlashDxe driver tired to employ against us.
No, this is specifically about things that are using SecureFlashCertData. I know for sure that it is possible to setup the FW to trust only Insyde 1st party code signed by the cert from DXE volume (set SecureFlashSetupMode to 0 instead of 1), but IDR if that is actually set like that now. Needs a bit more testing.
Yeah, I got that part, but I was specifically thinking about this bit from your outro: "as it turns out the DriverXXXX load options are still being processed even in the firmware update mode." (I should have said as much.) Is it processing the drivers but not loading them unless they're 1st party signed?
it is indeed the case, need to replace the image in part2 and explicitly state that. SecureFlashSetupMode is indeed set to zero, which limits trust to Insyde 1st-party software. The fact that a driver could run in such a mode is an oversight nevertheless, but I hope Insyde never signed any drivers with the same cert.